Introduction
If the world had a vaccine that could prevent one-third of all cancer deaths would we use it? The answer would appear obvious, yet the reality is that nearly half a century after establishing the link between smoking and cancer, nearly one quarter of the adult population in the United States continue to smoke cigarettes, and worldwide tobacco use is increasing (Connolly, 1992; Gajalakskmi et al., 2000) . How can this be, and what can be done to remedy this situation?
History of tobacco control
Programs and policies to discourage the use of tobacco products have a long history in the US and in other countries. The first recorded prohibition against tobacco use resulted from a clash between Peruvian native and Christian religious customs which led to a 1586 Papal decree declaring it a sin for any priest to use tobacco before celebrating or administering communion (Slade, 1993) . In the early 1600s King James I of England attempted to discourage the use of tobacco by taxing it, the czar of Russia exiled tobacco users to Siberia, and in China, those caught selling tobacco were executed (Kluger, 1996) . Despite these prohibitions, the use of tobacco continued to spread, especially in the US that garnered economic benefit from growing and exporting tobacco leafs around the globe (Kluger, 1996) . By the late nineteenth century, tobacco use was widespread, but most people used only small amounts and mainly in the form of pipes, cigars, chewing tobacco or a pinch of snuff. Cigarettes had to be hand rolled and thus were rarely used. This situation began to change in the 1880s following the invention of the automated cigarette-making machine that dramatically reduced the cost of cigarette production (Kluger, 1996) . However, it was not until the first World War, when men were introduced to cigarettes in their K-rations that cigarettes replaced cigars and chewing tobacco as the predominant form of tobacco (Kluger, 1996) .
At the turn of the century the anti-smoking movement in the United States was motivated mainly by moral and religious beliefs, although medical objections against cigarettes were beginning to be raised. Both Thomas Edison and Henry Ford voiced concerns about the detrimental health effects of cigarette smoking (Kluger, 1996) . In the first quarter of the twentieth century groups such as the Non-smokers Protective League, The Women's Christian Temperance Union, and religious leaders joined forces to prohibit the sale of tobacco and alcohol (Kluger, 1996) . However, the negative backlash against the federal prohibition on alcohol coupled with the more pragmatic approach of allowing governments to tax tobacco as a way of controlling its use resulted in the rescinding of most state and local prohibitions against tobacco.
By the 1930s efforts to limit smoking were fading away, allowing tobacco manufacturers to compete vigorously against one another by spending tens of millions annually in advertising to promote their brands (Kluger, 1996) . Cigarette advertisers were successful in associating smoking with images of health, athletic performance, wealth, and social standing which helped fuel a nearly three decade long increase in the prevalence of smoking (Pollay, 2000) .
Medical and scientific data implicating smoking as a cause of cancer first began to surface in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s (Proctor, 1999) . Ironically, the Nazis actually used this medical evidence to mount an aggressive campaign to discourage smoking in Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s. Smoking was banned in many workplaces, cigarette taxes were raised, advertising restrictions were introduced, stop smoking programs were implemented, and an aggressive public education campaign was waged against smoking (Proctor, 1999) . However, the German campaign against smoking and much of the medical evidence implicating smoking as a cause of cancer was largely ignored as a result of the Second World War. It was not until the early 1950s and 1960s when scientists from the United Kingdom and the United States began to publish their research linking smoking and cancer that the modern era of tobacco control was born.
With the widespread publicity of the findings in the 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health, tobacco use was added, virtually overnight, to the political agenda (US DHHS, 1989 Rabin and Sugarman, 1993) . Declining cigarette consumption in the US since the 1960s corresponds to increased public awareness of the dangers of tobacco use, changing social norms about tobacco, and increased governmental actions to regulate the use, sale, and advertising of tobacco products (Warner, 1986) . Today, nearly half of all living adults who ever smoked have stopped smoking. In the US, the incidence of smoking-caused cancers began to decline in the late 1980s resulting in an overall decrease in cancer mortality (Wingo et al., 1999) . Unfortunately, in many developing countries around the world, cigarette consumption is increasing which is predicted to fuel an overall worldwide increase in cancer incidence (Liu et al., 1998; Niu et al., 1998; Gajalakshmi et al., 2000) . This study attempts to explain the various social forces, programs and policies that have combined to influence tobacco use over the past half century in the US. The goal of this exercise is to try to understand what strategies might be applied by medical and public health workers to further accelerate the decline in tobacco use in the US as well as to stem the increasing upward trend in tobacco use in the developing world.
The modern era of tobacco control
Since the mid-1960s a wide array of programs and policies have been implemented in an effort to discourage the use of tobacco (US DHHS, 2000) . However, determining precisely which programs and/or policies have contributed most to population-wide fluctuations in tobacco use patterns is not easily accomplished given the multitude of factors that interact to alter these trends. Nonetheless, a substantial and growing body of scientific literature has emerged on the subject of what works in tobacco control. The British Medical Association even publishes a journal titled Tobacco Control which is devoted to publishing research papers on the impact of programs and policies to reduce tobacco use (www.tobaccocontrol.com).
Why people smoke?
In order to understand approaches used to discourage tobacco it is helpful to consider the question of why people smoke to begin with. There is little doubt today that nicotine in tobacco is the primary reason why most smokers continue to expose themselves on a daily basis to known toxins (US DHHS, 1988; Kessler, 1994) . As acknowledged by one Philip Morris scientist who stated the importance of nicotine bluntly as follows, 'No one has ever become a cigarette smoker by smoking cigarettes without nicotine' (Dunn, 1972) . The concept of smoking as an addiction has gained in popularity in recent years and offers a number of interesting, although until recently little used, policy options including: (1) government regulation of tobacco products; (2) tort damage claims by smokers against the tobacco companies; and (3) the provision of free or low cost smoking cessation programs funded by tobacco companies, taxes on tobacco products, or a requirement that such services be included in ordinary health insurance.
While the debate about whether smoking is a choice or an addiction is often presented in the popular media as an either/or proposition, most serious researchers in the field view smoking behavior as a blend of a combination of both cognitive and non-cognitive elements (Heath and Martin, 1993; Henningfield et al., 1993; Kessler, 1994) . However, until the 1980s, most tobacco control programs and policies ignored the concept of smoking behavior as an addiction. Instead, the focus of programs and policy efforts to reduce tobacco use relied mainly on an informed consumer orientation (US DHHS, 1989 .
Tobacco control interventions can be grouped into one of four general categories that describe the primary intent of the intervention. These include: (1) informing and educating consumers; (2) treating nicotine dependence; (3) using economic incentives to increase or decrease the cost of using tobacco; and (4) policies that limit opportunities to use, manufacture and/or sell tobacco products. The following sections of this paper attempt to summarize the evidence regarding the efficacy of each of these approaches to controlling tobacco use.
Informing and educating consumers
As a general rule, the goal of government regulation with regards to product safety is to ensure that consumers are informed about the inherent dangers of the product (Simonich, 1991) . It is commonly assumed that smokers are adequately informed about the health risks of smoking (Wilkenfeld et al., 2000; Cummings et al., 2002a) . In fact, one of the legal defenses used by the tobacco industry rests on the premise that smokers are adequately informed about the health risks of smoking. While population surveys do show that smokers today generally recognize some health risks from smoking, this does not necessary mean that they are adequately informed about smoking. For example, many smokers fail to appreciate that switching to a low tar and/or filtered cigarette does not make smoking less hazardous (Shiffman et al., 2001) . Also, smokers tend to be overly optimistic about their personal risk of illness (Ayanian and Cleary, 1999) . This misperception is due in part to the belief that the person will be able to stop smoking before health problems occur (Slovic, 2001) . Also, an optimistic perception of one's ability to stop smoking ignores evidence showing that the majority of smokers are dependent on nicotine, which will inhibit their ability to stop smoking easily (US DHHS, 1988) . Also, while general awareness of the health risks of smoking may be high in the developed world, this is not necessarily the case in many parts of the developing world where tobacco use is accelerating.
Government efforts to warn the public about the dangers of tobacco use have included: (1) requiring information about the health risks of tobacco on advertising and packages of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products; (2) sponsorship of antismoking campaigns through the mass media; and (3) the issuing of government reports summarizing information on the health risks of using tobacco, and disclosing the levels of certain tobacco smoke constituents. What is known about the impact of each of these efforts on cigarette smoking behavior is described below.
Warning labels
Congress has enacted a series of laws specifying that warning labels be placed on cigarette packages. The first of these laws was enacted in 1965 , updated in 1969 , and revised again in 1984 (US DHHS, 1989 . Also, in 1986, Congress enacted warning requirements for smokeless tobacco products (US DHHS, 1989) .
Eleven days after the 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health was released, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed rules requiring cigarette manufacturers to disclose on all cigarette packages and advertising that 'cigarette smoking is dangerous to health' and 'may cause death from cancer and other diseases ' (FTC, 1964) . However, before the FTC rule could take effect, Congress passed the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (US DHHS, 1989) . This law preempted the FTC warning label and in its place required the following health warning be place on all cigarette packages: 'Caution: cigarette smoking may be dangerous to your health'. Unlike the proposed FTC regulation, Congress did not require the warnings on product advertisements. The 1965 act also preempted federal agencies, state and local governments from issuing its own health warnings, and prohibited the FTC from requiring health warnings on cigarette advertising until July 1, 1969.
In 1969, the FTC again proposed regulations requiring manufacturers to print a stronger health warning on cigarette packages and on cigarette advertisements (FTC, 1969 (US DHHS, 1989) . Again, the Congressionally mandated warning was milder than that recommended by the FTC and omitted reference to death, and other specific diseases. The 1969 act also prohibited the FTC from requiring health warnings on cigarette advertisements until July 1, 1971. The 1969 act also preempted states and local governments from regulating cigarette advertising based on smoking and health concerns. In March 1972, FTC rules went into effect requiring manufacturers to display the same health warning mandated on cigarette packages on all cigarette advertising.
In 1981, the FTC issued a report on the effectiveness of the federally mandated cigarette warning label (FTC, 1981a) . The report concluded that the warning label was 'worn out', and had little impact on the public's level of knowledge about smoking (FTC, 1981a Despite an FTC recommendation that the size of the warning be increased and that the shape of the health warning be changed to a circle-and-arrow format making it more noticeable, Congress retained the size and rectangular format of the previous health warnings.
In 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, which mandated for the first time warning labels on smokeless tobacco products and advertisements (US DHHS, 1989) . Under the act, three rotating warning labels are required to be printed on smokeless tobacco packaging and advertisements using the circle-and- The 1986 law also preempted federal agencies and state and local governments from imposing additional health warnings on smokeless tobacco packages and advertisements. Despite the fact that government mandated health warning labels are an important area of government intervention on tobacco, few studies have actually evaluated the impact of warning labels on knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, or tobacco use behaviors (US DHHS, 1989; Simonich, 1991) . A recent review of the literature (Mitchell, 1999) listed 37 published articles and reports on health warning messages and toxic constituent labeling for tobacco products. Some studies assessed individuals' awareness or recall of existing warning labels (Malouff et al., 1992; Fischer et al., 1989) , believability of the messages (Cecil et al., 1996; Borland and Hill, 1997) , or presented them with existing, new, or proposed warning labels and asked them to comment on their possible effectiveness (Linthwaite, 1985) . Such studies are limited because they ask respondents to imagine how they or others might be affected rather than measuring actual effectiveness, and there may be a considerable discrepancy between the two. Other studies (Simonich, 1991; Ho, 1992; Robinson and Killen, 1997) have correlated knowledge of warning label messages with smoking behavior, but the use of cross-sectional designs led to problems of interpretation. In the only longitudinal study conducted on the effects of warning labels across a change in the labels, Borland (1997) surveyed smokers by phone before and 6 months after new, larger and enhanced warning labels were introduced in Australia in 1995. In both cross-sectional and longitudinal samples, smokers contacted after the new enhanced warning labels had been introduced provided survey responses that were consistent with the notion that the new warning labels had some beneficial effects, including a greater likelihood of noticing the health warnings, refraining from smoking on at least one occasion, and making a quit attempt. Although these results are consistent with the notion that enhancing warning labels may have beneficial effects, any inferences based on this one-group pre-post design are vulnerable to alternative explanations. Studies on US government mandated health warnings suggest that they are largely ineffective (Simonich, 1991) . In one study that used a sophisticated eyetracking device, 44% of adolescents asked to view cigarette advertisements did not even look at the warning label displayed on the advertisement (Fischer et al., 1989) . A second study evaluating warnings appearing on roadside billboards found that under typical driving conditions, observers could read the entire warning message on only 5% of cigarette advertisements (Davis and Kendrick, 1989 ). However, observers were able to identify the brand name and advertising message on the billboards.
In December 2000, the Canadian government introduced new graphic warning labels on cigarette packages (Mahood, 1999 ; see Figure 1 ). The new warning labels were enhanced in three ways. First, increased in size, from 25% of the package to 50%. Second, the warnings contain graphic color photographs depicting the adverse health consequences of smoking, including a cancerous lung, a burst blood vessel in the brain of a smoker who died of a stroke, and mouth cancer. Third, the new warnings on the outside of the package are accompanied by information on the inside of the package about the detrimental effects of smoking along with messages designed to encourage smokers to quit; these include specific messages designed to increase both smokers' efficacy to quit and to highlight the response efficacy of quitting. A recent survey (Cunningham, 2002) of Canadian smokers found that 90% had noticed the new graphic warnings and 44% said that the new warnings had increased their motivation to stop smoking. Strahan et al. (1999) identifies the following features of warning labels as critical to the their salience: (1) if the warning label is located on the larger surfaces (i.e., front and back); (2) larger warning labels are more likely to be noticed than smaller labels; (3) warning labels located at the top of the surface as opposed to the bottom; (4) if the warning label is graphically dissimilar to the rest of the packaging. Based on these criteria, the current US warning labels would be judged to be lacking in salience. The overall low salience of the US warning labels may account for their weak effects on influencing smoking trends (Balla et al., 1984; Simonich, 1991; Fischer et al., 1993) .
Some investigators have suggested that no matter how graphic the warning label might be consumption will not be affected unless smokers are given substitutes to use in place of cigarettes (Simonich, 1991) . For example, Simonich (1991) noted that studies have found that labeling of food products substantially alters consumption so long as close substitutes exist (i.e., shifting from high fat to lower fat foods). Since cigarette warnings provide exactly the same information for every brand they have no ability to stimulate brand switching. As a group, cigarettes do not have a close substitute that can be used to provide the nicotine that most smokers crave. In the US, nicotine gum and nicotine skin patches are available only by prescription and are therefore not good substitutes for cigarettes (Warner et al., 1997) . This situation could change if nicotine medications were made more readily available at a competitive cost compared to purchasing cigarettes (Warner et al., 1997; Novotny et al., 2001) . Cigarette companies are also developing nicotine delivery devices that look and taste like regular cigarettes, but do not contain the same levels of toxic constituents as conventional cigarettes (see Figure 2a ,b, Hoffmann et al., 2001; Wilson, 2001) . These alternative tobacco products are being designed to appeal to the health concerns of smokers, and may represent closer substitutes for conventional cigarettes. At present, it is not clear whether these alternative tobacco products should be required to carry the same health warning found on regular cigarettes (Stratton et al., 2001 ).
Informational campaigns
Although concerns about increasing cancer rates associated with cigarette smoking began to appear in the medical literature in the 1930s, it was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the research on smoking and cancer began to receive media attention. Despite the emerging scientific consensus that smoking was a cause of lung cancer, the tobacco industry continued to reassure the public that cigarettes were not injurious to health (Pollay, 1997; Cummings, 2002) . The controversy about smoking as a cause of ill health helped fuel media attention on the subject of smoking and health, which in turn contributed to increasing levels of public awareness of the health risks of smoking (Warner, 1989) . Pierce and Gilpin (2001) have shown that the level of news media coverage of smoking and health in the US from 1950 to the early 1980s mirrored population trends in awareness about smoking as a cause of lung cancer and rates of smoking cessation.
The first large scale national counter-advertising campaign to educate the public about the health risks of tobacco use occurred between 1967 and 1970 when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required licensees who broadcast cigarette commercials to provide free media time for antismoking public service announcements (PSA) under the Fairness Doctrine (US DHHS, 1989). The Fairness Doctrine, which was repealed by the FCC in 1988, obligated licensed broadcasters to 'encourage and implement the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues over their facilities, over and beyond their obligation to make available on demand opportunities for the expression of opposing views' (FCC, 1987) .
In January 1967, an attorney by the name of John Banzhaf, petitioned the FCC to apply the Fairness Doctrine to cigarette advertising (US DHHS, 1989) . In June of 1967, the FCC accepted Banzhaf's petition and ruled that licensed broadcasters were required to air roughly one antismoking message for every three cigarette brand commercials. In July 1967, antismoking PSAs developed by voluntary health agencies and the government began to air. Unlike most public service advertising campaigns, many of the antismoking ads were aired during prime time. The time donated for the antismoking messages amounted to approximately 276 million dollars per year (in 1993 dollars). The Fairness Doctrine campaign ended in January 1971, as a result of a federal law that banned cigarette advertising on television and radio. After 1970, the number of antismoking PSAs declined markedly as antismoking messages were forced to compete for donated airtime.
Between 1967 and 1970 cigarette consumption in the US dropped at a much faster rate than during the period immediately before or after the time when the Fairness Doctrine antismoking campaign was operational (US DHHS, 1989) . While it is impossible to rule out the effects of other influences that may have contributed to the decline in cigarette consumption between 1967 and 1970, several studies have concluded that the antismoking messages mandated by the Fairness Doctrine were responsible for much of the reduction in smoking during this period (O'Keefe, 1971; Hamilton, 1972; Warner, 1989; Simonich, 1991) . Support for this conclusion is found in a study published by O'Keefe (1971) that found high levels of recall for the antismoking PSAs aired as part of the campaign among both adults and youth. Analysis of trends in national survey data also suggest that the Fairness Doctrine PSAs contributed to increases in public knowledge of the health hazards of smoking (US DHHS, 1989) .
The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the tobacco industry and state governments provided resources to create a new foundation -the American Legacy Foundation -that had as one of its mandates sponsorship of a national counter-advertising campaign (Daynard et al., 2001; Healton, 2001 ). The American Legacy Foundation was created in 1999 and has spent approximately $100 million annually on a nationwide broadcast counter-advertising campaign (known as the 'truth campaign') targeting teens and young adults. The campaign has been successful in creating a high level of awareness of its messages among the intended target audience although it is still too early to determine what effect the campaign will ultimately have on smoking behavior (Healton, 2001) .
The experience with the Fairness Doctrine antismoking messages has prompted some state governments to implement paid anti-tobacco advertising campaigns to counteract the impact of cigarette advertising. The main problem with a counter-advertising approach is funding it. Several states including California, Massachusetts, and Oregon have used ballot initiatives to increase cigarette taxes with the proceeds from the tax earmarked to finance informational campaigns against tobacco. Figure 3 shows two examples of billboard advertisements run as part of California's paid antitobacco advertising campaign. Other states have also used funds from the MSA to finance tobacco education campaigns. Evidence in support of the effectiveness of paid counter-advertising campaigns is found in the sharp declines in cigarette consumption observed in states that have invested heavily (in contrast to those that have not) in paid counter-advertising campaigns (see Figure 4 ; Harris et al., 1997; Pierce et al., 1998; Siegel and Biener, 2000; Fichtenberg and Glantz, 2000; US DHHS, 2000) .
Issuing government reports
Since 1964, government agencies have issued hundreds of reports summarizing the scientific evidence about the health risk of tobacco use (US DHHS, 1989) . Many of these reports are required under legislative mandate. Because these reports frequently receive extensive media coverage and are widely disseminated, they have helped educate the public about the health risks of tobacco.
The Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 require that the Secretary of Health and Human Services produce an annual report for Congress updating information on the health consequences of smoking. These reports are referred to as Surgeon General's Reports. Including the 1964 Report of the Surgeon General (which was not mandated by Congress) there have been 27 US Surgeon General's Reports on smoking.
The impact of these reports on smoking behavior is difficult to assess, although several studies suggest that the first Surgeon General's Report in 1964, contributed to a drop in cigarette consumption (Hamilton, 1972; Warner, 1989; Simonich, 1991) . Recent reports have helped influence policy development on such issues as passive smoking (1986 report, US DHHS, 1986 , nicotine addiction (1988 report, US DHHS, 1988 , and youth tobacco use (1994 report, US DHHS, 1994).
Federal law also requires the FTC to produce an annual report for Congress on cigarettes sales and advertising (US DHHS, 1989) . These reports generally include data on per capita cigarette sales, market share for filtered and unfiltered cigarettes, the market share for cigarettes of varying tar and nicotine yields, and cigarette advertising and promotional expenditures. Over the years, the FTC has proposed rules which would require cigarette manufacturers to list yields of tar, nicotine, and other hazardous components on their packages and in their advertising. In 1967, the FTC opened its own laboratory to analyse the tar and nicotine content of cigarette smoke. In 1981, the FTC published a list showing the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yields of domestic cigarette brands based on its own laboratory tests (FTC, 1981b) . However, the FTC has also acknowledged that its testing procedures are flawed and probably underestimate the amount of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide that smokers receive from smoking (NCI, 1996) . In 1987, the FTC closed its laboratory, and has relied on nicotine, tar, and carbon monoxide ratings provided by the cigarette industry under a voluntary reporting agreement (US DHHS, 1989). Today, cigarette companies are not required to disclose information about the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes. However, the disclosure of tar and nicotine levels is frequently seen on packaging and on advertising. Such disclosure is done voluntarily, and usually appears on cigarette brands with less than 8 mg or less of tar, but rarely for higher tar brands. Some researchers have speculated that the FTC effort to inform people about tar and nicotine yields of cigarettes may have inadvertently increased cigarette demand by suggesting that less dangerous cigarette brands exist (Warner and Slade, 1992; NCI, 1996; Pollay and Dewhirst, 2002) .
The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984 and the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 require manufacturers of tobacco products to annually provide a list of additives used in manufacturing to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (US DHHS, 1989). However, the government is required to treat the lists as 'trade secrets'. Under these laws Congress can be informed about research activities on health risks of these additives and may call attention to ingredients that pose a health risk to smokers. Otherwise, the lists of additives must be treated confidentially and not divulged to the public. These laws also did not give the government authority to regulate the use of additives in tobacco products, even if a health hazard is identified.
Many government reports are issued without a specific legislative mandate. For example, in 1992 the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an important scientific report on the health risks of ETS (EPA, 1992) . This report received extensive media coverage and has helped reinforce public concern about the dangers of ETS and has served as a springboard for both public and private regulatory initiatives to protect nonsmokers from tobacco smoke (Kennedy and Bero, 1999).
The publication and dissemination of scientific information on the health consequences of tobacco use represents the least coercive of government interventions to combat tobacco (Pierce and Gilpin, 2001 ). The impact of this effort on tobacco use behavior is impossible to measure precisely. However, information dissemination is essential to the formulation of all other policy initiatives. Without appropriate information, it is difficult to form the popular consensus necessary to create and enforce more restrictive policies.
Treatments for smoking cessation
Historically, the vast majority (490%) of former smokers have reported that they stopped smoking without receiving formal assistance or help from anyone (Hughes, 1999) . However, this statistic has changed in the past two decades with the introduction and wide scale availability of effective drug therapies to help smokers alleviate withdrawal symptoms commonly associated with cessation (Hughes, 1999) . Prescription only nicotine gum was introduced in the US in February 1984. The nicotine patch was introduced in 1992. In 1996, the FDA granted overthe-counter (OTC) status to nicotine gum and patch. Shiffman et al. (1997) tracked sales of pharmacological aids to smoking cessation and found that nicotine gum and patch sales increased 250% in the year following approval of OTC status. Today, approximately one third of smokers who report making a quit attempt indicate that they have used some form of nicotine (patch, gum, inhaler, nasal spray) or non-nicotine therapeutic aid (bupropion) (Hughes, 1999) . Randomized clinical studies have demonstrated the efficacy of these stop smoking medicines for smoking cessation (Fiore et al., 2000) . However, data are still lacking as to the impact of expanded access to and utilization of these stop smoking medications on population smoking rates (Novotny et al., 2001) . New therapeutics approaches for treating nicotine dependence are under development (Swain et al., 1996; Hieda et al., 1999; Westrum et al., 2001) . One company has begun clinical trials of a vaccine for the treatment of nicotine addiction (Thompson, 2002) . The treatment is intended to block nicotine delivery to the brain, thereby removing the main reinforcement for smoking. The conjugated vaccine works by stimulating the immune system to produce antibodies that find and attach to nicotine molecules. The resulting compounds are too large to pass through the blood-brain barrier so that most of the nicotine is unable to reach the brain. Animal studies (Hieda et al., 1999) have clearly demonstrated that the vaccine can work, however, it remains unclear if human smokers will respond to the vaccine by increasing cigarette consumption to compensate for the lack of nicotine. However, should this treatment modality work it would have profound implications for addressing the problem of nicotine dependence.
Economic incentives
It is well recognized in economic theory, as well as in everyday life, that purchasing decisions are influenced by the affordability of a product (Watson, 1972) . The affordability of a good is influenced both by the price of the good as well as the income of the consumer. The price of tobacco products is determined by the manufacturer's price, wholesale and retail markups and tobacco taxes.
Price of tobacco products
One of the most straightforward ways to influence the price of tobacco products is through taxation. Studies indicate that taxes on tobacco products, usually in the form of an excise tax, are passed directly onto the consumer (US DHHS, 2000) . In the US, tobacco taxes are levied at the federal, state, and local levels. During the first part of the century taxes of tobacco products were typically very low, were primarily used to generate revenue, and were raised infrequently. In 1951, the Federal tax was set at 8 cents per pack -the level at which it would remain for more than 30 years (Orzechowski and Walker, 2000) . With the release of the first scientific studies on the health risks from smoking in the 1950s, and the subsequent 1964 Surgeon General's report, the landscape began to change. Many states began increasing cigarette excise taxes in an apparent effort to reduce smoking and its consequences. Economists and others began producing studies documenting the impact of cigarette taxes and prices on smoking, particularly among youth and young adults. These findings led to growing pressure from public health groups for further increases in state taxes and increased federal cigarette taxes. Eventually, the federal cigarette tax was doubled to 16 cents per pack on January 1, 1983. In the 1990s federal cigarette taxes were progressively raised to its current rate of 39 cents per pack. Since 1980, most states have increased taxes on tobacco products, with some increases of 200% or more .
Economists use estimates of the price elasticity of demand to quantify the impact of a change in price on consumption. Formally, the price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in consumption resulting from a 1% increase in price. While a relatively wide range of estimates has been produced for the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, most of the estimates from the US and other high-income countries tend to fall in the relatively narrow range from 70.25 to 70.50 (Chaloupka et al., 2001 ). Thus, a cigarette price rise by 10%, overall translates into a reduction in cigarette smoking by between 2.5 and 5%. Several recent studies imply that half or more of the effect of price on overall cigarette smoking results from reductions in the number of smokers. Moreover, a number of recent studies conclude that youth smoking is relatively more sensitive to price than adult smoking, with some estimates implying that teen smoking is up to three times more sensitive to price than adult smoking (US DHHS, 2000) .
Indirect economic incentives
While tobacco taxes represents a fairly direct means of influencing consumption, other policies can influence the price of tobacco products indirectly. For example, Figure 4 Trends in per capita cigarette consumption in California and the rest of the United States before and after the California public health campaign on tobacco the federal policy of tobacco price supports and the allotment system, which were designed to aid tobacco farmers, has helped keep the price of domestically produced tobacco artificially elevated. Also, product liability suits brought against tobacco manufacturers have had an effect on increasing the price of tobacco products (Daynard, 1994) . Although product liability suits are not policies per se, legislation pertaining to them could influence the impact of legal actions against tobacco manufacturers. For example, some states have enacted legislation which exempt tobacco manufacturers from product liability actions.
Insurance premiums
In 1964, a person's smoking status was not a consideration in the premiums paid for insurance. Today, premium differentials based on whether a person is a smoker or not are nearly universal for life insurance, and increasingly common for health insurance. Smoker-nonsmoker premium differentials were first introduced by the life insurance industry in the mid-1960s when actuarial studies demonstrated the higher mortality of smokers compared to nonsmokers (US DHHS, 1989; Schauffler, 1993) . Because life insurance is usually sold on an individual basis it is possible to adjust prices according to the applicant's mortality risk status. Health insurance, on the other hand, is typically purchased on a group basis, usually as an employment benefit. As a result health insurance policies are seldom tailored to individual health risks. Differences in health insurance premiums paid by smokers and nonsmokers are much less common, although this situation is changing (US DHHS, 1989; Parkinson et al., 1992; Schauffler et al., 2001) .
Currently, publicly funded health insurance such a Medicaid includes coverage for nicotine replacement therapy in about 30 states, although eligibility requirements vary widely between states. An increasing number of private health insurance carriers now provide coverage for stop smoking treatments, although this benefit is by no means universal. Congress or state governments could mandate coverage of smoking cessation treatments by insurance companies, but this has not occurred to date (Novotny et al., 2001) .
Among adult smokers, premium differentials may have both an economic and educational effect that discourages smoking (US DHHS, 1989; Curry et al., 1998) . In addition to increasing the cost of smoking, higher premiums charged to smokers help to reinforce knowledge of the harm caused by smoking. Health insurers who cover the cost of smoking cessation programs and aids, reduce the cost of quitting for the smoker, and provide an economic incentive to cessation providers to offer more services.
Restriction on tobacco
Public policies intended to inform consumers about the health hazards of tobacco or that make tobacco products more costly, discourage tobacco use indirectly. A third category of policies affect tobacco use more directly by limiting locations where tobacco can be used, and by placing restrictions on the sale and advertising of tobacco products.
Restriction on where tobacco products are used
In 1964, there were no laws regulating smoking in public locations such as schools, public transportation, government buildings, elevators, and restaurants. However, as scientific studies regarding the health consequences of passive smoke exposure began to emerge, policies limiting where people could smoke also increased. Today, nearly all states and thousands of localities have enacted laws restricting smoking in public places and workplaces (NCI, 1993) . Most businesses, and several fast food restaurant chains, have instituted no smoking policies. Federal law prohibits smoking on buses, trains, and on domestic airline flights (US DHHS, 1989) . In 1994, Congress outlawed smoking in most of the nation's public schools and in federally funded programs that serve children including Head Start centers, day-care centers, and community health centers. The US military prohibits smoking in common work areas. Smoking has even been restricted in many outdoor sports arenas. As Brandt (1990) points out '. . . cigarette smoking has become the most rigorously defined of all public behaviors'.
Policies restricting where people can smoke have made smoking less socially acceptable and have contributed to reductions in smoking behavior, although the precise impact on smoking behavior is difficult to quantify (US DHHS, 2000) . Econometrics studies by Simonich (1991) ; Wasserman et al. (1991) , Emont et al. (1993) and Evans et al. (1999) have each found that the strength of a state's smoking rules were important predictors of reduced aggregate cigarette consumption, even after controlling for other types of government policies (i.e., higher taxes). Thus, while rules limiting the locations where people can smoke are intended to protect the health of nonsmokers, these rules have helped redefined smoking behavior in our society, making it less acceptable, more inconvenient and less pleasurable, thereby encouraging cessation and discouraging uptake of smoking.
Restrictions on tobacco sales
With over 40 million adult cigarette smokers, a total prohibition on tobacco sales is not practical. However, in the US, there is a tradition of limiting minors' access to tobacco products (US DHHS, 1994; IOM, 1994) . The argument for limiting tobacco sales to minors is based on the idea that children and adolescents may not be mature enough to adequately appreciate the long-term consequences of their use of tobacco (IOM, 1994) . Abundant evidence illustrates that many youths who begin to use tobacco do not fully comprehend the nature of addiction and as a result, believe that they will able to avoid the harmful consequences of smoking by stopping smoking after a few years (IOM, 1994; Slovic, 2001) .
Laws intended to curtail tobacco sales to minors date back to the turn of the century (US DHHS, 1994) . In 1964, all but two states had laws prohibiting the sale or gift of tobacco to children. After 1964, several states repealed their tobacco access laws because they were not being enforced. However, in recent years governments at all levels have begun to address the problem of youth access to tobacco. Today, all states have enacted laws that prohibit the sale of tobacco products to persons under the age of 18 years. In 1993, Congress passed legislation that linked state program funding for mental health services to control of youth access to tobacco (US DHHS, 1994) . As a result, several states and hundreds of localities have taken meaningful steps to enforce youth access laws.
The impact of enforcing youth access laws on deterring tobacco use by minors remains unclear, although the emerging evidence suggests that the impact is likely to be small (Cummings et al., 2002c) . The only community based experimental study that has been done for the explicit purpose of measuring the impact of enforcing retailer compliance with a tobacco youth access law on youth smoking was conducted by Rigotti et al. (1997) in Massachusetts. This study involved three matched pairs of communities with one community within each pair randomly assigned to get active enforcement of the youth access law while the other communities received no active enforcement of the law. This study demonstrated that active enforcement of the law increased retailer compliance, but had little impact on indicators of adolescent smoking behavior. However, the real public health benefit of a reinvigorated effort to limit youth access to tobacco may not lie directly on its effect on youth smoking behavior, but rather on the declarative effects of reinforcing the social norm that disapproves of tobacco use.
Restrictions on tobacco product marketing
In the US the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to regulate the advertising of consumer products to prevent 'unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce' (FTC, 1964) . Over the years, the FTC has used its regulatory authority to challenge the advertising practices of cigarette manufacturers. For example, in 1950, the FTC prohibited the RJ Reynolds company from claiming in its advertising that Camel cigarettes aided digestion, did not impair the wind or physical condition of athletes, would never harm or irritate the throat or leave an aftertaste, were soothing, restful, and comforting to the nerves, and contained less nicotine than any of the four largest selling brands (Wagner, 1971) . In 1983, the FTC blocked the advertising of Brown and Williamson's Barclay cigarettes for incorrectly stating the tar yield, and in 1986, the FTC successfully challenged an RJ Reynold's advertisement that misrepresented the results of a study on heart disease and smoking (US DHHS, 1989) .
In 1964, the FTC proposed rules for regulating the imagery and copy of cigarette ads to prohibit unsubstantiated health claims (FTC, 1964) . However, the FTC rules were never adopted due to passage of the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. Public pressure to regulate tobacco advertising was widespread and strong in the mid-1960s, especially because of concerns regarding youth smoking. In 1963, the average teenager viewed 100 cigarette commercials a month (Pollay, 1994a) . In response to mounting pressure to limit cigarette advertising, in 1964, the tobacco industry adopted a voluntary code of conduct (Pollay, 1994b) . The tobacco industry's self-regulatory code, which is still in use today, covered four areas: (1) advertising appealing to the young; (2) advertising containing health representations; (3) the provision of free tobacco samples; and (4) the distribution of promotional items to the young (Pollay, 1994b) . For example, a specific stipulation of the voluntary code is that models used in ads should not appear to be younger than 25 years of age. Over the years, public health groups have argued that the voluntary code is inadequate and largely ignored by the tobacco industry (Blum and Myers, 1993) .
In 1969, the FTC recommended in a report to Congress that a ban on cigarette advertising on television and radio be enacted (FTC, 1969) . In 1969, Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act that prohibited cigarette advertising in the broadcast media effective beginning in 1971 (US DHHS, 1989) . Congress extended the ban on broadcast advertising to little cigars in 1973, and to smokeless tobacco products in 1986 (US DHHS, 1989) . The federal law banning cigarette advertising on television and radio also included a clause preempting states and localities from regulating or prohibiting cigarette advertising or promotions for health reasons. The purpose of the preemption was to avoid chaos created by different, potentially conflicting regulations. However, the effect of the federal preemption is that few states and localities have attempted to regulate advertising of tobacco products (US DHHS, 1989) . In recent years, a number of cities and states have acted to restrict transit advertising, the free distribution of tobacco product samples, and point-of-sale advertising. In Massachusetts, a state law prohibiting point-of-sale advertising was recently revoked on the basis of violating the federal preemption on cigarette advertising.
In 1998, as part of the MSA cigarette manufacturers agreed to discontinue billboard advertising, advertising in magazines with a high percentage of underage readers, and place limits on their sponsorship of sporting and cultural events (Daynard et al., 2001) . The actual impact of the MSA agreement on smoking behavior has not been formally evaluated, although the impact on youth smoking habits appears to be minimal since adolescent smokers continue to report smoking the most heavily advertised cigarette brandsMarlboro, Newport, and Camel (Kopstein, 2001 ).
The impact of voluntary and government restrictions on tobacco advertising and promotion has been the subject of many research studies. In a recent review of the evidence on the effectiveness of advertising bans, Saffer (2002) concluded that cigarette consumption is reduced when a comprehensive advertising ban is implemented. Saffer (2000) noted that in countries that have enacted partial advertising bans the industry has typically found ways to get around the restrictions by increasing advertising expenditures in alternative venues. For example, following the 1971 US broadcast ad ban cigarette marketing expenditures increased and were redirected into the print, billboards, and promotions. Evidence suggests that the same thing has occurred following the MSA agreement in 1998, with advertising revenue shifted from billboards and magazines to point-of-sale and retail marketing incentives (King and Siegel, 2001; Wakefield et al., 2002) .
Advertising may influence tobacco use in a number of ways. For example, advertising could encourage current smokers to smoke more, reduce the resolve of current smokers to stop or to consider stopping, encourage ex-smokers to take up smoking again, and seduce nonsmokers, especially children, to use tobacco (Warner, 1986) . Critics of the cigarette industry have argued that a large share of cigarette advertising is intended to encourage induce young people to smoke (Blum and Myers, 1993) . The portrayal of extreme sports popular with young people in cigarette adverting, sponsorship of sporting events such as auto-racing, and the use of promotional items with appeal to young people all support the view that a share of cigarette product marketing is intended to induce young people to smoke (see Figure 5a -c). Recent analyses of internal tobacco industry documents confirm this intent and suggest that cigarette manufacturers explicitly design and formulate cigarette brands to appeal to beginning smokers (Cummings et al., 2002b; Wayne and Connolly, 2002) . Internal industry documents also reveals that advertisements of filtered and low tar cigarettes were intended to reassure smokers concerned about the health risks of smoking, and to give the 'health concerned smoker' an alternative to quitting (Pollay and Dewhirst, 2002) . The inherent deceptiveness of marketing low tar cigarettes has caused some countries to consider enacting legislation to ban the use of marketing labels such as 'light' and 'mild' (Bates et al., 1999) .
Product regulation
In the US, nearly all consumer products are subject to a variety of federal regulatory statutes designed to insure that the products are safe and that consumers are informed about possible risks. Tobacco products, however, are an exception (IOM, 1994; Kessler, 1996) . With the exception of warning labels, Congress has explicitly excluded tobacco products from regulatory control both for political and practical reasons. During the mid-1990s the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) attempted to exert regulatory control over tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) that gives the FDA authority to regulate drugs 'intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man'. However, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, and not the FDA, is the only Federal group that has the authority to regulate tobacco products. New York State recently enacted the first state law intended to regulate the design of cigarettes (Brown and Williamson, 2000) . This law requires cigarette manufacturers to design cigarettes so they more readily self extinguish, thus lowering the risk of a fire resulting from a smoldering cigarette.
Without some type of regulatory oversight there remains little incentive for manufacturers to design and formulate less hazardous cigarettes. The incentives that have worked to cause the industry to change in the past have related to consumer demand and liability risk. Increased consumer awareness of the health risks of smoking during the 1950s and 1960s was the main reason cigarette manufacturers introduced filtered and low tar cigarettes (Pollay and Dewhirst, 2002) . However, industry documents reveal that their scientists recognized that these product design features would not reduce the risks of smoking and most likely contributed to a smoker maintaining their smoking behavior under the false belief that their disease risk would be reduced by switching to a filtered low tar cigarette (Leavell, 1999; Pollay and Dewhirst, 2002) . The recent wave of litigation against the tobacco industry has resulted in the tobacco industry introducing a number of new novel cigarette-like products (Wilson, 2001 ). However, it remains to be seen whether any of these new products can reduce cancer risk (Stratton et al., 2001) . At least for the foreseeable future, it is likely that tobacco products will remain lawful and thus devising efforts to promote the development and marketing of less harmful alternatives to conventional cigarettes would seem like sound public health policy (Sweanor, 2000; Hoffmann et al., 2001; Wilson, 2001; Stratton et al., 2001; Cummings, 2002) .
As it stands today, there is really no real incentive for the cigarette industry to change the status quo. Competition to produce more consumer-acceptable medicinal nicotine products would be helped by educating consumers about what factors in tobacco products really contribute to disease risk (Sweanor, 2000; Kozlowski et al., 2001) . Amazingly, many smokers don't perceive much difference in health risk between smokeless tobacco products, nicotine medications and cigarettes (Cummings, 2002 ). Yet if all nicotine products were put on a risk continuum the actual difference between smokeless and nicotine medications would be seen as pretty minor compared to the difference in disease risk between smoked and smokeless products. Until smokers are given enough information to allow them to chose products because of lower health risks, then the status quo will likely remain (Wilkenfeld et al., 2000; Cummings, 2002c) . Unfortunately, the MSA created economic disincen- 
Conclusions
The past 50 years has witnessed a dramatic change in attitudes toward and use of tobacco by Americans (US DHHS, 1989; US DHHS, 2000) . Most public health scholars believe that this change has been accelerated by public policy interventions to reduce tobacco use (Warner, 1989; Simonich, 1991; US DHHS, 2000; Jha et al., 2000) . The research literature suggests that the most potent demand reducing influences on tobacco use have been increasing the financial cost of using tobacco products primarily through taxation, smokefree policies, comprehensive advertising bans, and paid counter-advertising (US DHHS, 2000; Jha et al., 2000) . Other policies such as the requirement of warning labels on tobacco products, restrictions on tobacco sales to minors, and increasing access to stop smoking services appear to have had less direct impact on cigarette consumption, although the potential impact of these policies may not have been fully realized to date. For example, it is probably too soon to determine the population wide impact on smoking rates and ultimately on disease incidence of access to nicotine medications. Emerging knowledge regarding possible genetic modifiers of treatment response and the development of new therapeutic modalities such as the nicotine vaccine hold the promise of dramatically altering the way society addresses the problem of nicotine dependence in the future.
Up to now, government policies have actually hindered the development and marketing of less harmful alternatives to conventional cigarettes (Warner et al., 1997; Jha et al., 2000) . If all nicotine products were regulated on the basis of their risk of causing health problems, nicotine medications would be the least regulated while cigarettes would be the most heavily regulated. Ironically, just the opposite has occurred with nicotine medications carefully regulated by governments while cigarettes have escaped regulatory control (Warner et al., 1997; Sweanor, 2000; Stratton et al., 2001) . Developing a rational basis for regulating nicotine delivery products on the basis of harm would appear to hold great promise for achieving a rapid reduction in the health toll caused by cigarettes (Kozlowski et al., 2001) .
